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In 1981, Chile pioneered in transforming its pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system into the 
first private and funded pension system. The following paper presents the effects the 
structural reform had on the economy and assesses whether the reform achieved its 
objectives. To do so, it starts by presenting the pension system prior the reform, to 
proceed introducing the general structure of the current system. The paper continues 
presenting the macroeconomic, microeconomic and social results of the reform. The 
analysis finishes presenting the current social discontent and challenges the system is 
facing towards the future. The conclusion is that further reforms, mainly targeting 
competition in the AFPs market and the consolidation of the unfunded first pillar, must be 
implemented to achieve both, the results policymakers pursued in 1981 and the 
objectives modern pension systems should comply.   
 
 
En 1981, Chile fue pionero en transformar su sistema de pensiones de reparto en un 
sistema privado de capitalización individual. Este trabajo presenta los efectos que la 
reforma estructural tuvo en la economía y evalúa el cumplimiento de sus objetivos. Para 
esto, comienza presentando el sistema de pensiones previo a la reforma, para continuar 
exponiendo la estructura general del sistema actual. El trabajo continúa explicando los 
efectos macroeconómicos, microeconómicos y sociales de la reforma. El análisis finaliza 
presentando el actual descontento social con el sistema previsional y los desafíos que este 
enfrenta de cara al futuro. La conclusión es que es necesario implementar nuevas 
reformas, principalmente promoviendo la competencia en el mercado de AFPs y en la 
consolidación del segundo pilar solidario, para conseguir tanto los resultados que las 
autoridades buscaban en 1981, como los objetivos que los sistemas previsionales 
modernos debiesen cumplir.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As the United Nations states on its 2015 World Population Ageing Report, the world population 
is ageing. This increase in the proportion of older people in the composition of the population is 
already implying, and will continue to do so, various social and economic challenges with direct 
consequences on policy making. How to ensure adequate standards of living for the elderly, 
easing not only consumption smoothing across lifetime, but also poverty and inequality levels 
within the senior population, is now at the centre of the discussion. Thereby, Pension Systems 
seem to be a key issue on the current and future social and economic context. 
However, having a pension system that is able to achieve those main objectives -reducing 
elderlies’ poverty and enabling consumption smoothing- while being economically sustainable, 
is not a trivial issue. Proof of this is our closest example: the Spanish pension system. Its pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) pension system has turned to be inadequate for this new composition of 
population as the life expectancy and the rate of dependency of the system –the ratio between 
those who should receive a pension and the active population- have increased. The 2011 and 
2013 reforms undertaken may have help balance the Social Security’s budget, but have failed to 
ensure population that the adequate standards of living while retired will be safeguarded in the 
future. In this context, how current and future pension will be paid is today an important 
concern not only to Spanish policymakers, but to the Spanish society in as whole: Spain needs to 
find an alternative and sustainable pension system.  
Another example on how difficult is to develop a sustainable pension system, capable of 
achieving the objectives mentioned before, can be found on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean, in Chile. The Chilean case is one of the most iconic examples on structural reforms on 
the pension system. In 1981, the South American country pioneered in transforming its PAYG 
system to a fully private funded system with Defined Contributions (DC). Even if within an 
ageing population context this model is not as likely to have sustainability problems as the 
Spanish system, it is a pension system that is far from perfection. Thirty-six years after its 
implementation the model has been highly questioned by the Chilean society due to the 
precariousness of its benefits and its lack of redistributive effects. Throughout the vox populi, 
the idea that the model has failed to achieve both objectives –the reduction of old-age poverty 
and consumption smoothing- has increased sharply during the last decade. This social 
 3 
discomfort has given rise to several social movements that ended up materializing in the 
creation of the Presidential Commission on the Pension System on 2014. 
Those two examples can give us an idea about how complex implementing an effective and 
sustainable pension system turns to be, providing us more than enough reasons on how 
important it is to perform a deep and comprehensive analysis on empirical cases to find answers 
to the challenges pensions are facing towards the future.  This paper is intended to assess the 
results of the Chilean pension reform of 1981, as it is the oldest case of a structural reform, 
thus, allowing us to perform a more comprehensive and long-run analysis.  
The first section of this essay, Context and theoretical framework, will start providing an insight 
on what economic theory says about pension systems and the differences between a PAYG and 
a funded pension system. It continues giving a quick overview on the Chilean pension system 
prior the 1981 reform by analysing the traits and the evolution of the system as well as the 
problems it presented. Finally, the reform process and the new Chilean pension system will be 
explained.  
The second section, Results, is intended to present the effects the Chilean reform had on the 
economy. It will start presenting the macroeconomic effects of the reform in terms of the fiscal 
costs imposed and in terms of the effects the reform had on national savings and economic 
growth. Then, the microeconomic effects will be presented, analysing the both the newly 
created AFPs market and the capital market. The section continues presenting the social effects 
of the reform, which mainly include the coverage, pensioner poverty and equity issues of the 
pension system. The section ends by presenting some statistics on the perception and 
knowledge of the system the Chilean society has.  
The third section, Discussion, will contrast the results presented with the general and specific 
objectives the reform pursued. It will also give a quick overview on the future challenges the 
system is facing and on the recommendations the Presidential Commission has made to solve 
them.  
The paper finishes presenting the main conclusions regarding the Chilean pension reform of 
1981 and the problems it is facing towards the future.  
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II. HYPOTHESIS AND OBJECTIVES 
Hypothesis  
After thirty-six years since its implementation, the Chilean pension system has turned to be a 
mature and sustainable system. However, it still has numerous deficiencies that need to be 
addressed by the Chilean authorities in order to accomplish the objectives proposed in 1981.  
Objectives  
This essay seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis on the Chilean pension system, analysing 
it from 3 different dimension: (a) the context in which it was implemented; (b) the 
macroeconomic, microeconomic and social effects the 1981 reform had on the Chilean 
economy; (c) and the challenges the system is facing towards the future. 
After getting a deeper understanding on the results the Chilean pension system reform had, an 
assessment on the accomplishment of the objectives set by the Chilean authorities, as well as 
the general objectives any pension system should pursue, will be performed.  
The novelty of the Chilean pension system when it was implemented, but also the long time 
that has passed since them, make it an interesting case-study as it allows us to analyse it from a 
long-term perspective.  
What effects had the reform on the Chilean economy? How successful was the structural 
reform in solving the problems the Chilean pension system was facing before the reform? Who 
have been the winners and losers of the Chilean pension reform? What are the system’s 
challenges facing the future? How can the system be improved? These are some of the 




To answer the questions presented above and to elaborate of this paper, secondary sources of 
information will be used along three different phases.  
First, a bibliographic review will be performed on the theory about pension systems, mainly 
based on the works by Nicholas Barr and David Blake. This revision will include theory on the 
main objectives a pensions system should pursue, the different types of pensions system and 
the differences and advantages of those models. The bibliographic review will proceed with an 
analysis on the Chilean pension system before 1981, studying its history, structure, peculiarities 
and the causes and context that surrounded the structural reform. This part of the bibliographic 
review will be mainly based on the studies performed by José Pablo Arellano during the 1980s 
and by Carmelo Mesa-Lago during the 1970s. Finally, the 1981 reform will be studied and 
described using information from the Chilean Decreto-Ley N. 3500 of 1980, the Chilean Law Nº 
20.255 of 2008, the Chilean Superintendence of Pensions and the paper “The Structural Pension 
Reform in Chile: Effects, Comparisons with other Latin American Reforms, and Lessons” by 
Alberto Arenas de Mesa. 
The second phase will consist of a systematic collection of historic and current data on the 
Chilean pension system and on some macroeconomic indicators. This data that will be used to 
study the results the reform had from a dynamic perspective analysing their evolution over time 
(1981-2016, when possible). In order to study some dimensions from a comparative 
perspective, data on other OECD and Latin American countries’ pension systems will also be 
collected. The main databases that will be used are: data and statistics from the Chilean 
Superintendence of Pensions, the Central Bank and the Budget Direction; the World Bank and 
the OECD databases; and, in some particular cases, the papers and books used as bibliography.  
Finally, with the purpose of discussing the hypothesis presented and driving some conclusions, 
the results obtained will be contrasted with the theoretical framework presented in the first 
sections of this study.  
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IV. CONTEXT AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1. Theoretical framework 
Before starting to analyse the specifics of the Chilean case, it is important to review briefly the 
basic features of pension systems and what does literature says about the differences between 
a funded and a PAYG pension scheme. 
4.1.1. Pension systems 
As Blake (2006) explains, a pension can be understood as a series of payments between a 
person’s retirement and his death. The main objective these payments pursue are: (a) 
consumption smoothing –to provide an income to retired workers that do no longer receive 
labour income, in exchange for their contributions made to the pension system while they were 
active; (b) insurance on the uncertainty related to a person’s life length.  Further, pensions may 
also pursue two extra public policy objectives: (c) poverty relief, providing a minimum living 
standard for their elderly; and (d) distributional objective, giving more resources to specific 
groups of people.  
There are two main financial schemes that can be used to pay those pensions. Within a funded 
scheme, pensions are private and financed through a fund that accumulates as workers save a 
part of their wages. These savings are invested in financial assets to obtain returns which are 
also part of the fund. The other scheme –the PAYG scheme- works as a contract based on 
promises, as pensions are paid by the State with the contributions made by current workers to 
the pension system, which in turn, pay them trusting that they will get their pensions when time 
comes.  
Modern pension schemes are said to be based on three pillars, which may or may not be 
present in a country’s pension system. The first pillar includes the pensions paid by the Welfare 
State of the country. It is essentially an unfunded system with a defined benefit (DB) scheme, 
where pensions or annuities received are normally calculated as a fraction of the person’s salary 
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while working1. The Spanish pension system would be a good example of a system with great 
predominance of this first pillar.  
The second pillar is a mandatory private system financed through a funded scheme. This pillar is 
the most significant component of the Chilean pension system. Although some countries, like 
Germany and the USA, have a DB schemes within their second pillar, there is an increasing trend 
on replacing them with defined contribution (DC) scheme. The combination of funded DC 
schemes is also known as the Individual Account (IA) model. Within this model, no level of 
pensions is promised as it depends on the final value of the fund –contributions and returns- 
accumulated during the working life. In the IA model, pensions also depend on the payment 
scheme used: pensions can be paid as Annuities, hiring an Insurance Company to pay a lifetime 
constant pension (in real terms); as a Programmed Withdraw, keeping the individual account 
and recalculating the pension amount each year taking into account the fund balance, life 
expectancy and future expected returns; or as a combination of both. 
Finally, pension systems may also include a third pillar composed by any voluntary additional 
savings that the individual may keep for retirement, either as self managed deposit accounts or 
mutual funds, or through a formal pension scheme.  
4.1.2. PAYG or funded? 
As explained in the introduction, there is an increasing concern on reforming pension systems in 
order to make them less vulnerable to demographic pressures while meeting their main 
objectives.  In this context, reforms towards private funded pensions have been presented not 
only as desirable but also as necessary and urgent (Barr, 2002). But, where do these ideas come 
from? What changes in an economy when the pension scheme is changed from a PAYG to a 
funded scheme? 
The desirability of shifting pension systems towards a funded scheme may find its roots in the 
conception that funding resolves problems related to adverse demographics. By definition, 
funded DC pensions do not have sustainability problems: pensions are calculated and paid 
based on the fund that has been already accumulated or, in other words, the available 
                                                            
1 It can be based just on the salary earned on the last years of the working life, introducing distortions on wages 
and labour mobility, or on the average salary over an extended period. (Barr, 2002) 
 8 
resources. However, having a sustainable system does not imply that the pensions will be high 
enough to ensure the living standards of the elderly.  
Since pensions are so complex, the pros and cons of each pension scheme should be analysed 
carefully before implementing a reform. Barr & Diamond (2010) explain several lessons and 
conclusions offered by economic theory that should be considered while framing policy design 
of pension systems. 
First of all, it is important to notice that every pension system shares the associated risks 
differently. These differences arise mainly from the underlying philosophy behind them and 
depend both on the benefits scheme –DC or DB- and on the funding scheme –PAYG or funded. 
While within a PAYG DB, risks are shared between workers and pensioners, within a fully funded 
DC plan the risk may be bear by the insurance company, if the pensions are paid through 
annuities, or by the worker, if pensions are paid through a programmed withdraw.  
Second, the fact that governments deal with a series of different constraints while designing 
their pension system implies that no pension system will ever be the single best.  This is due 
both to the multiplicity of objectives a pension system may pursue –and that cannot be 
completely achieved at the same time-, and to the diversity of constraints a government may 
face regarding its fiscal and institutional capacity and the economy’s behavioural parameters 
and initial income distribution.  
Consequently, moving towards a funded scheme may not always be the right policy. Even when 
this conclusion may sound obvious, some of the advantages that have been attributed to 
funded schemes, and that have boost this idea of funded pension systems as the most desirable 
scheme, are not always completely true.  
A widespread belief is that funded pension systems increase national savings, boosting 
investment and, therefore, economic growth. Although this may sound very appealing, many 
issues arise from this sole premise. First of all, it may be the case that savings do not increase 
with the implementation of a funded system as households saving may just shift from being 
voluntary to mandatory, keeping the savings rate rather unchanged. Furthermore, even when 
the increase in saving might happen, it may not be desirable if the country has a savings rate 
that is already high –like China. Second, the idea that an increase in saving does imply an 
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automatic increase in investment is not only quite a naïf, but a very strong assumption. Finally, 
this premise has intergenerational redistributive effects that should be also considered: if 
funded schemes do increase savings, then consumption must decline, imposing a burden on 
current generations to benefit future generations which may or may not be a desirable 
outcome. 
Another advantage that has been attributed to funded systems is that they can help on the 
development of formal capital markets, improving the efficiency of transforming savings into 
productive investment. However, this will depend on how effective the regulation and 
administration of those capital markets is, as they may not have enough incentives to allocate 
the funds into the most productive investments. 
Finally, from the fiscal point of view, funded pension systems have also been pointed out as a 
way of reducing public pension spending. Though this can be true in the very long run when the 
system has already reached maturity, it is not a valid argument in the medium-short run. As it 
will be studied more in-depth with the Chilean case, transition costs can increase sharply the 
short-term budgetary pressures.  
Therefore, the assessment of reforming a PAYG system into a partial or fully funded scheme 
should be done very cautiously: it is important not to overstate the advantages of shifting into a 
funded system, taking into consideration that some assumptions that are often made may not 
hold in reality and that the empirical outcome of the reform may not meet the expected one.  
4.2. The Chilean situation before the 1981’s Reform 
4.2.1. Pre-1981 Chilean Pension system 
The history of the Chilean Social Security dates back to 1924, when the president Arturo 
Alessandri Palma pioneered in implementing a social security pension system. During the last 
years of the XIX and the first years of the XX century the massive migrations to cities caused an 
important deterioration in the living conditions of workers. This situation turned into popular 
discontent not only among workers, but also among an influential fraction of the military, which 
pressured Congress to approve a social security law on health coverage and retirement pensions 
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in 1924. This first social security system introduced a compulsory social insurance that covered 
health care as well as disability and retirement pensions for blue-collar (industrial) workers. 
During 1925, the system generalised and other similar compulsory insurances were created for 
white-collar (administrative) workers, civil servants and journalists. By 1965, more than 70 per 
cent of the labour force was affiliated to the system in different institutions.  
Between the 1920s and 1981, Chilean pensions were organized under a PAYG2 scheme with 
defined benefits (DB), where several semi-public institutions (Cajas de Previsión) administrated 
the contributions paid by workers, employers and by the government in its role of civil servants’ 
employer. These institutions were independent from each other and were normally intended to 
a specific segment of the labour force, following the basic scheme created during the 1920s. 
Thereby, workers received different benefits and had different retirement ages and 
prerequisites depending on which type of jobs they performed. This segregated situation was 
always a cause of concern for the authorities who presented several, but non-successful, 
projects to reform the Social Security system trying to homogenize the benefits provided and 
their financing as well as to simplify the administrative procedures. It wasn’t until 1981, with the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, when the social security system was reformed and unified.  
It is important to highlight some changes suffered by the system during the years prior the 
reform, as they may help us understand better the general context in which it was 
implemented. 
During the first years of the dictatorship, which started in 1973, the coverage of the system was 
extended and the contribution rates were increased, accounting for more than 50 per cent of 
the workers’ labour income3 (Bustamante, 1996). Nonetheless, during this same period workers 
suffered a sharp reduction in the benefits received due to the absence or non-proper 
readjustment of the transfers given, despite of the high inflation rates registered.  This traduced 
into a sharp reduction on the pensioners’ purchasing power, which dropped by 26% between 
1973 and 1982 compared to 1969-70. (Arellano, 1988) 
                                                            
2 During the first years, the system worked as a partially collectively funded scheme as resources needed to pay the 
retirement benefits were less than those collected. The difference was saved and capitalized as a reserve that 
ended up disappearing when the system reached maturity.  
3 Since the revenues were used indistinctly, this 50% global contribution rate includes contributions paid (and used) 
for pensions, health care, work accidents, early retirement and eviction, among others.  
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Moreover, during the last years prior to the reform the employers’ contributions were reduced, 
attempting to decrease labour costs and, consequently, the high unemployment rates. This 
caused a further reduction on pension benefits and a higher pension deficit on the 
administrative institutions that had to be covered with revenues from the government’s general 
budget.  The combination of high unemployment rates and high informal work (mainly cause by 
the excessive contributions), made the coverage of the labour force drop from 79 to 62 per cent 
between 1974 and 1980.  
Summing up, before 1981 Chile had an uncoordinated social security that rested on more than 
10,000 uncompelled laws and regulations. Within this system, more than 160 independent 
semi-public institutions were in charge of paying pension benefits (among others) that were 
financed through a non-funded scheme. This implied that the system had different regimes, 
retirement requisites, contribution rates and benefits for each type of worker, that combined 
into 31 systems of old-age retirement, 30 of seniority retirement, 30 of disability and near a 
hundred of other systems related to health-maternity, unemployment compensations and 
social welfare. To make it worse, there was no single state agency supervising the planning, 
policy-making or coordination of the whole social security system (Mesa-Lago, 1978).  
4.2.2. Problems with the previous pension system  
Ever since the early 1960s, the problems of the Chilean social security system were 
acknowledged. As Mesa-Lago (1978) explains, studies at the time showed that it was one of the 
most discriminatory systems in the world. Its extreme complexity caused deep inequality 
problems that needed to be solved through the standardization of the prerequisites to acquire 
benefits, the elimination of privileges and the expansion of coverage to the entire labour force. 
However, neither these key reforms nor those related to the legal, administrative and financial 
unification of the system were ever passed. By 1980, the system did not only have problems 
regarding the unequal access to benefits among workers, but also issues related to a financial 
mismatch within the institutions and deep administrative inefficiencies.  
Regarding the financial mismatch, the semi-public institutions that administrated the funds 
were not financially sustainable as they showed persistent deficits with respect to the resources 
collected from workers and employers’ contributions. These deficits were covered with direct 
transfers from the State’s general budget, which accounted for more than 30 per cent of the 
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system’s revenues between 1950 and 1980. However, about 60 per cent of those transfers were 
intended to cover an accounting mismatch on the civil servants’ social security institution (the 
Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas). The reason for the existence of this gap was 
that the government, as the civil servants’ employer, paid lower contributions than the private 
sector even when the pensions for public sector workers were higher. Taking that accounting 
problem out of the structural deficit, the State’s direct transfers would still have accounted 
about 10 per cent of the total social security revenues. Nonetheless, as Arellano (1988) explains, 
these extra revenues were mainly used to cover the pensions for the lower income affiliates, 
introducing a redistributive component to the social security system that should not be 
considered a problem by itself.  
The real deficiencies of the system were related to its administrative and equity problems. Even 
when the system was progressive and respected the principle of vertical equity, it was widely 
seen as an unfair system. The reason for this social perception was that the system did not 
respect the horizontal equity principle: depending on whether the worker was a civil servant or 
a white or blue collar worker, the benefits received varied widely. For instance, in 1981 the 
pension benefits for civil servants were twice those received by other civilian workers with the 
same labour income, even when the total contribution rates were higher for private workers. 
(Arellano, 1988) 
Finally, one of the main reasons used to justify the 1981 reform in terms of decentralization and 
privatization were the important administrative inefficiencies and the very high administrative 
costs of the system. In this respect, it was thought that the introduction of competition between 
private institutions would help reduce those costs, as prices would be used as a mechanism to 
gain competitiveness. This perspective, however, ignored two important issues: on one side, 
insurance markets have higher sales costs that do not allow this expected cost reduction and, 
on the other side, there could be economies of scale that rather justified a centralized system. 
As Arellano (1988) explains, even when a structural reform was needed, the convenience of 
replacing the existing system with a private funded system could not be inferred from the 
analysis of the system’s defects.  
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4.3. The Chilean Pension System 
In May 1981, Chile’s public social security system was radically reformed, transforming it form a 
public PAYG DB system into a private, but mandatory, fully funded DC system. During 27 years, 
the Chilean pension system remained almost unchanged, until 2008 when a new Pension 
Reform was implemented. It introduced several changes in the system mainly intended to 
promote competition, reduce the administration costs of the system and reduce gender and 
income inequality among the elderly. This new reform formalised the first pillar of the system, 
turning it into a mixed system, having the presence of the three pillars. This section reviews the 
current Chilean pension system, including the changes introduced by both reforms. Figure 1 
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Figure 1: Pension system scheme after the 2008 reform 
(a) Not covered within the scope of this paper; (b) Managed by 2 specific institutions: CAPREDENA and DIPRECA; (c) Military workers  
Sources: Elaborated using the scheme proposed by Fundación Sol (2013) and bibliography used in this paper. 
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Since its origins, the administration of the Chilean pension system has been composed by two 
main entities: First, we have the newly created private insurance corporations named Pension 
Fund Managers, or AFP (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones), replacing the former Cajas 
de Previsión. These pension managers are for-profit companies, completely independent and 
unrelated to the workers’ employer4, whose sole purpose is to invest in the most profitable 
way, but attending to some risk limitations, the pension fund of their affiliates. Second, there is 
a public regulatory agency, named the Superintendence of Pensions5, which supervises and 
regulates the functioning of the three pillars of the system. 
 As mentioned above, the current Chilean pension system follows a mixed scheme, where the 
three pillars are present. We will start revising the second (funded) pillar as it was the one that 
was first created. 
The affiliation to an AFP and, therefore, to the second pillar of the system, is automatic and 
mandatory to every new worker and, since 2008, goes to the AFP with the lowest commissions. 
Affiliates are allowed to change from one AFP to another, but they are obliged to remain in the 
same AFP it for at least 2 years6. 
Once affiliated, every worker pays, through his employer, a percentage of his labour income to 
his AFP. This percentage varies depending on the AFP, but it always includes a 10 per cent 
contribution rate that goes to the worker’s individual capitalization account and a commission 
charged by the AFP for its managerial duties7. Today, this commission is just a fix percentage of 
the workers’ salary, equal for every worker belonging to the same AFP, but before the 2008 
reform it also included a fix price, in Chilean pesos, that constituted a regressive component of 
the system.  
As mentioned above, the managerial duties of the AFPs only include the investment of the fund 
to get the highest returns possible, attending to some risk limitations. Although some of those 
limitations are set by the Superintendence of Pensions, workers can also make decisions on the 
risk taken with their savings as each AFP follows a multi-fund scheme. Thereby, each AFP has 5 
                                                            
4 As opposed to the case of the USA, where companies sponsor the funded pension plans for their workers.  
5 Substituting the Superintendence of AFP since the reform of 2008. 
6 Since 1998. Further explanations are provided in section 5.2.1. 
7 Commissions have varied widely over time, being 0.41% the minimum and 3.97% the maximum registered.  
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types of funds that go from A, the riskier fund, to E, the most conservative fund, among which 
their affiliates can freely change at any time. 
As previously explained, workers entering the labour market after 1981 must enter to the 
funded system. However, those workers that were already insured by the public system when 
the 1981 reform was implemented, had a short period to choose between remaining in the old 
system or changing to this new private system. To encourage the latter option, the government 
promised to recognise all the contributions paid to the public system through a fiscally funded8 
bond (Recognition bond) issued at the value that the worker’s pension would have represented 
if the reform had not been implemented. Nevertheless, for those workers that decided to 
remain in the old system, the government promised to administrate and finance their pensions 
until the end. The administration of the pensions of those workers was left in hands of a new 
institution named National Institute of Pensions (INP), which was replaced in 2008 by the Social 
Pensions Institute (IPS). 
The IPS is a public institution in charge of administrating the transition pensions as well as the 
rest of the first pillar of the system. Besides the transitional component, this first pillar includes 
some unfunded pension benefits for the civilian population. Although the 1981 did include 
some unfunded benefits9 aimed at accomplishing the poverty relief objective, it wasn’t until 
2008 when the first pillar was formally introduced and its scope enlarged. First, the Solidarity 
Pension Contribution (APS for its Spanish acronym) was created. This State-financed benefit 
targets those retirees that have contributed at least once to the funded system but do not meet 
certain minimum pension level and comply the requisites of with being older than 65, having 
lived for at least 20 years in Chile and being part of the 60th poorer percentile10. Another benefit 
created in 2008 was the Solidarity Basic Pension (PBS for its Spanish acronym), targeting those 
people that do comply the requisites to get the APS but do not have the right to any other 
pension benefit, either private or public. Additionally, the 2008 reform introduced pension 
benefits for disabled workers and a pension bond for women with children. 
The third pillar of the system is mainly composed by the APV: an additional voluntary pension 
account, managed by the same AFP, for workers who are willing to pay a higher contribution in 
order to achieve a higher level of pensions while retired.  
                                                            
8 The bonds were capitalized at a 4% real interest rate. 
9 A Minimum pension guarantee and a Welfare Pension.  
10 It increased gradually from the 40th percentile in 2008, to the 60th percentile in 2011.  
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When the worker retires –at age 60 for women and at age 65 for men– pensions are financed by 
the fund accumulated in the insured’s individual account11 and can be paid as an annuity, 
programmed withdrawal, or a combination of both. This implies that the benefits the retiree 
receives will depend on the amount of contributions paid during the working life, the capital 
returns gained, the life expectancy and gender of the pensioner and the modality of payment 
the retiree chooses. If the pension received does not meet a certain minimum, the retiree can 
apply to the APS benefit. 
Finally, three particular features of the 1981 Reform should be highlighted. First, the system was 
only made mandatory for workers employed under a dependency relation, making the 
affiliation of the self-employed workers voluntary. This situation changed in 2008, when the 
gradual introduction of mandatory contributions to the self-employed workers was 
implemented as a direct consequence of the enlargement of the first pillar beneficiaries.  
Second, the armed forces’ social security system was not included in the 1981 Reform, 
remaining as a public PAYG system that has not been modified to the date. Additionally, the 
government committed to finance the future deficits the system could (and does) have. Third, 
the employer’s premium was eliminated, reducing total contributions just to the worker’s 
premium. After the 2008 reform, employers are obliged to pay a risk and death insurance to 
their workers and can create and contribute to a collective APV in benefit of their workers.  
  
                                                            
11 And in the APV, if the worker has one. 
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V. RESULTS 
After thirty-six years under a funded pension system, the Chilean economy has experienced 
several effects caused directly or indirectly by the pension reform. The following section reviews 
the effects of the reform from three different scopes: macroeconomic, microeconomic and 
social. 
5.1. Macroeconomic effects 
5.1.1. Fiscal costs 
One of the first questions that arise while thinking on reforming a PAYG system into a funded 
pension scheme is how to finance the transition. The reason for this concern is quite 
straightforward: if we were paying pensions with the current contributions and now those 
contributions will go to a savings fund, how can we keep paying the current pensions?  
The Chilean government’s approach to that issue was committing to ensure that all pensioners, 
current and future, would keep receiving a pension. Furthermore, Chilean policymakers 
committed not to finance them through public deficit or the emission of new public debt, but 
through a strong fiscal discipline. Thereby, an important burden was imposed on the Chilean 
fiscal budget, which managed to operate with a surplus during a great part of the 1990s and 
2000s, mainly by increasing taxes and reducing public spending (Uthoff, 2001). 
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Table 1. Average Fiscal Surplus & Transitional Costs  
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 Avg. 2010-15; 
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While analysing the fiscal costs of the reform, it is important to distinguish between those costs 
that are structural and will remain as time goes by, and those costs that have a transitional 
nature and, thus, will tend to disappear as the system matures.  
The transition costs of the Chilean reform are related to the issuing of recognition bonds and to 
the pensions paid by the IPS. These costs have been fully financed with direct charge to the 
Central Government’s fiscal budget. As it can be observed in figure 2, the transitional deficit has 
been quite significant during the whole period, representing an average of 3.2 per cent of the 
GDP between 1981 and 2016. Although their composition has changed over time and that they 
show a clear decreasing trend since 2003, transitional costs still accounted for 1.9 per cent of 
the GDP on 2016, with 1.4 percentage points of it representing IPS pension payments. When 
expressed as a fraction of the total government expenditure, transitional costs accounted for 
more than a quarter of the spending between 1981 and 2016 (table 1), reaching a maximum of 
38.1 per cent of the total government expenditure in 1991. 
 
Although the transitional costs show a decreasing trend and are expected to disappear in the 
future, this will not happen before 2050. Data from the Superintendence of Pensions shows that 
in December 2016 a 10.5 per cent of the workers contributing to the IPS had between 51 and 56 












Dissagregated transitional costs 
(As a fraction of the GDP) 
Recognition Bonds 
PAYG Pensions 
Figure 2                                     Sources: Elaborated using data form Uthoff (2001) and Superintendence of Pensions  
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paying pensions until 2053 approximately12. Furthermore, assuming the youngest affiliates to 
the PAYG system were 16 years old at the time the reform took place, costs associated to the 
recognition bonds will still endure until 2030.  
 
Besides these transitional costs, the 1981 reform imposed some other structural costs to the 
fiscal budget, arising from two very different sources. The first is directly related to the poverty 
relief objective. As mentioned before, the 1981 pension system did include some unfunded 
benefits to lower-income retirees and since 2008 it includes the APS and PBS as part of its first 
pillar. It is interesting to notice that neither the 1981 nor the 2008 reform considered any 
specific contribution or related tax to finance this first pillar thus, those expenses are 
immediately considered to be part of the pension deficit.  
The other source of structural deficit appears as a direct consequence of the context in which 
the reform was implemented. Since during 1981 Chile was governed by a military dictatorship, 
the reform did not include the armed forces and the police social security systems which remain 
as two specific programmes that depend on the Ministry of Labour and Social Prevision.  The 
evolution of the structural costs is presented in figure 3. 
 
                                                            










4,5 Evolution of the structural fiscal costs  
as a percetage of the GDP 
(1981 - 2016) 
Armed Forces PS 
First Pillar 
Figure 3                             Sources: Elaborated using data form Uthoff (2001), Superintendence of  
Pensions  and the Dpt. of Budget Management 
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The structural costs have had a very dissimilar evolution. The costs related to the first pillar13 
have accounted for an average of 0.5% of the GDP during the whole period and show an 
increasing trend over time, especially after the 2008 reform, accounting a 0.8 per cent of the 
GDP on 2016. While the transitional fiscal costs will tend to disappear over time, the opposite 
behaviour may be expected from poverty relief spending. As it can be observed in table 3, the 
number of beneficiaries of the APS programme has grown steadily since its implementation in 
2008, reaching more than 700 thousand people in 2015. Moreover, this behaviour is consistent 
with the fact that since 2011, the average pension received by the Chilean retirees from the 
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2005 -  -  -  - 160,0  - 
2006 -  -  -  - 167,1  - 
2007 -  - 70,0  - 185,6  - 
2008 -  - 120,0  - 202,4  - 
2009 64.003 582.317 150,0 75,0 196,9  - 
2010 327.307 619.800 200,0 76,1 201,5 547,3 
2011 423.189 620.644 255,0 78,6 204,1 571,1 
2012 517.338 610.388 261,8 81,0 210,7 602,4 
2013 612.521 595.450 266,7 82,4 217,6 625,4 
2014 673.041 582.572 279,8 86,0 235,1 653,2 
2015 729.471 578.993 291,8 89,8 244,6  - 
Table 2. Evolution of the components of the structural deficit 
(a) Estimated from the total pension expenditure and the number of retirees 
Sources: Superintendence of Pensions and Dpt. of Budget Management 
  
 
On the other side, we have the expenditures associated to the military pension system. While 
this spending increased substantially during the first years of the reform, it suffered a sharp 
decline during the late 90s, coinciding with the end of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. Since 
2005, these expenditures have stabilized around a 1 per cent of the GDP. It is important to 
notice that although the military workers do pay social security contributions, those 
contributions only covered a 19.7 per cent of the pension spending in 2003 and an 18.5 per cent 
in 2016. Thus, their pension expenditures should not be entirely considered part of the pension 
deficit even when it more than an 80 per cent is financed by the state’s general budget. 
                                                            
13  Not including the disability pensions for contributors under 65 that are also financed through public spending. 
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This special treatment to the armed forces has further feed the social discontent with the 
system, not only because of how they are financed, but also because the average military 
pension is 2.8 times higher and has increased at a faster rate than the average civilian pension: 
19.3 per cent against 16.7 per cent between 2010 and 2014.   
Summing the four components described above the average pension deficit has accounted for a 
5.1 per cent of the GDP between 1981 and 2016 and a 3.9 per cent between 2006 and 2016 
(table 3). This decline has been mainly driven by the reduction in the transitional components of 
the deficit, which represented the 70 per cent of the pension deficit during the 90s and early 
2000s. During the most recent years the structural deficit has increased its weight and today the 
two deficits have almost the same weight on the total. Therefore, how the Chilean pension 
deficit evolves in the future will not only depend on how fast the transitional costs disappear, 
but also on whether the likely increase in the structural deficit offsets that reduction.  
Year Transitional PD Structural PD Total PD Transitional/Total 
1981 1,5 2,3 3,8 39,5 
1985 4,4 2,3 6,7 65,7 
1990 3,8 1,5 5,3 71,6 
1995 3,6 1,3 4,9 73,2 
2000 4,0 1,7 5,7 71,0 
2005 3,1 1,6 4,7 66,4 
2010 2,7 1,6 4,3 62,6 
2015 2,0 1,6 3,6 54,7 
2016 1,9 1,7 3,6 53,0 
Averages  
1981-89 3,2 3,0 6,1 51,5 
1990-99 3,8 1,6 5,3 70,7 
2000-09 3,3 1,6 4,9 66,3 
2010-16 2,3 1,6 3,9 57,9 
1981-2016 3,2 1,9 5,1 62,2 
Table 3. Composition of the Pension Deficit (as percentage of the GDP) 
Sources: Uthoff (2001) and Sp. Of Pensions 
5.1.2. National Savings and Economic Growth 
One of the arguments used by Chilean authorities as a further justification for shifting from a 
PAYG pension system towards a funded one was that it would help increase national savings 
and, thus, boost the country’s economic growth. However, as explained in section 4.1.2. the 
mechanisms how this could happen are not as straightforward as it could be initially thought.  
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As it can be observed in figure 4, national savings did show a sharp increase after the reform 
was implemented, as well as a reduction in its volatility. However, measuring the direct effects 
the pension reform had on Chile’s national savings is extremely challenging: first, because of the 
lack of consistent and disaggregated data prior 1981; second, because the pension reform took 
place in a framework of many other structural reforms that liberalised capital markets and 
promoted savings through fiscal incentives.  
 
In this respect, some studies14 have shown that a part of the increase in national savings can be 
attributed to the pension reform, not only as direct boosts on private savings but also through 
the development of capital markets and a higher productivity growth. However, the main part 
of this rise in national savings should be attributed to the fiscal incentives and tax reform that 
managed to sharply increase corporate savings rate and to the increase in public savings, 
derived from the fiscal pressure caused by the pension reform (Gill et al. 2005, p. 119). The 
latter has been considered one of the most important components of the increase in national 
savings, as the Chilean government carried out a severe fiscal discipline in order to finance the 
pension deficit.  
                                                            
14  Schmidt-Hebbel, K. 1997. Pension Reform, Informal Markets and Long Term Income and Welfare, Working Paper 
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Figure 4                       Sources: Elaborated based on historic data on macroeconomic aggregates of the 





Therefore, as explained by several scholars15, when the average annual fiscal costs of the reform 
are subtracted from the capital accumulation generated by the pension funds, both as 
percentage of the GDP, the overall result is a net savings deficit. Considering the period 
between 1981 and 2004, this net deficit accounted for 3 per cent of the GDP, as the capital 
accumulation represented the 2.5 per cent of the GDP, while the fiscal costs accounted for a 5.5 
per cent. Although this net deficit could be considered just a transitional effect, as explained 
before, the length of the transition –estimated to last more than 60 years- imposes a significant 
burden that should not be ignored on the long-run effects the reform could have on national 
savings. 
Likewise, it is extremely challenging to assess to which extent the pension reform contributed to 
the change in trend that can be observed in economic growth after the 1981 reform (figure 4), 
as it took place, as previously highlighted, in a framework of many other structural market-
oriented reforms. However, as explained by Barr (2002), if we assume that the surplus used to 
pay the pensions’ deficit would have rather been used for consumption instead of investment 
and taking into consideration the effect the reform had on the development of capital markets 
(explained in the following sections), it could be considered that the 1981 reform did had a 
positive effect on economic growth. Yet, even when some studies claim to have found how 
much the pension reform contributed to the good Chilean economic performance since the 
1980s, these results should be analysed with extreme carefulness, as performing these type of 
estimations is inherently difficult. 
Consequently, although the 1981 pension reform may have had some boosting effect on 
economic growth and private national savings, this increase should not be overstated and 
should be assessed taking into consideration the burden the reform imposed in public saving. 
Furthermore, it is important to reassert that, although desirable, the increase in national savings 
and greater economic growth should not be objectives pursued by a structural pension reform.  
                                                            
15 Arenas de Mesa (2006), Barr (2006) and Uthoff (2001), among others. 
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5.2. Microeconomic effects 
5.2.1. The AFPs Market: Competition and Administrative Costs 
One of the main objectives of the 1981 reform was to increase the efficiency of the pension 
system by introducing competition in its management. Using an extremely simple model with 
very strong assumptions, policymakers thought that a greater and idealised competition would 
exert a downward pressure on prices and, therefore, would lower managerial costs for workers.  
Table 4 shows the evolution on the number of AFPs, commissions charged and the 
concentration of the market. As it can be observed, the AFPs market has always been 
concentrated: when the reform was implemented, 12 AFPs appeared in the market but only the 
3 biggest AFPs concentrated more than the 60 per cent of the contributors, with half of them 
concentrated in which, to the date, is the biggest AFP in terms of affiliates and contributors.  
The 36 years of the AFPs market could be divided into 4 periods. First, a period of concentration 
during the 1980s, characterized by an almost inexistent entrance of new firms to the market 
and by an increasing trend on the commissions charged. Second, a period of strong competition 
during the 1990s, with a massive entrance of new AFPs and a reduction on the commissions 
changed. During this period, there was a high affiliate transfer between AFPs, mainly driven by 
the direct monetary incentives given to the sales agents, which increased marketing costs, 
reducing the AFPs’ rates of profit. To avoid this inefficient behaviour, a new regulation was 
implemented in 1998 regarding the affiliate transfer and the incentives given to the sales agents 
(Berstein, 2011). By the end of this second period, the market was further concentrated, with 
only 8 AFPs left and the 3 biggest AFPs16 sharing more than three quarters of the contributors.  
The third period, which starts in 1999 and finishes in 2008, could be described as a period of 
stagnation in every sense: the market seemed to fluctuate around 6 AFPs, a commission of 2.4 
per cent of the labour income and the concentration of 77 per cent of the contributors in the 3 
biggest AFPs. What did change during this period was the rate of profits gained by the AFPs, 
which increased sharply, giving the biggest AFPs huge economic power. This situation 
encouraged the changes in regulation introduced by the 2008 reform.  
                                                            





























Annual average Market share (% of contributors) 
Year # AFPs Commission Biggest AFP (a) 3 biggest AFPs 
1981 12 2,52 
 
63,06 
1982 12 2,56              32,10  63,64 
1983 12 3,38              30,38  60,22 
1984 12 3,58              29,70  62,01 
1985 13 3,56              29,97  62,76 
1986 12 3,47              30,39  63,98 
1987 12 3,42              29,95  66,23 
1988 13 3,58              29,53  66,36 
1989 13 3,48              30,13  67,71 
1990 14 3,33              34,48  71,85 
1991 14 3,26              31,46  68,66 
1992 19 3,23              30,67  68,90 
1993 22 3,24              31,83  68,34 
1994 22 3,20              31,44  67,52 
1995 21 3,22              31,82  67,12 
1996 17 3,10              31,97  66,39 
1997 13 3,00              31,34  67,22 
1998 15 2,84              34,99  72,13 
1999 8 2,63              40,17  77,42 
2000 8 2,52              40,94  76,50 
2001 8 2,49              42,38  78,05 
2002 7 2,36              41,09  78,05 
2003 7 2,36              41,49  79,18 
2004 7 2,37              40,63  77,51 
2005 7 2,38              39,10  77,72 
2006 6 2,40              37,63  77,95 
2007 6 2,46              40,17  77,46 
2008 7 2,67              40,06  87,23 
2009 5 2,24              39,83  86,55 
2010 6 1,55              38,11  85,27 
2011 6 1,55              35,99  81,90 
2012 6 1,52              34,04  78,32 
2013 6 1,48              33,02  76,00 
2014 6 1,35              32,03  73,40 
2015 6 1,16              30,82  71,10 
2016 6 1,16              28,65  67,74 
Table 4. Evolution of the AFPs’ Market                           
(a) AFP Provida has always been the biggest                                           Source: Superintendence of Pensions 
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Since the implementation of the 2008 reform, and even when the number of firms has not 
increased significantly, the system has shown some positive changes: the market is less 
concentrated and the commissions changed have declined sharply. Both results could be mainly 
attributed to the new bidding of the new affiliates, which now goes to the AFP with lower 
prices.  
 
It is interesting to notice that when comparing the evolution of prices with the evolution of the 
number of AFPs, there isn’t either the negative correlation as it could be expected. As it can be 
observed in figure 5, the higher the number of AFPs, the higher the prices and the lower the 
dispersion between the commissions charged. This shows that, as mentioned before, 
commissions charged have not been sensitive to competition, but they are rather sensitive to 
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Figure 6 shows an estimation made with Gretl using historic data17 on the average performance 
showed by every AFP that has existed in the system during their years of presence in the 
market. Model 1 shows that historically, there has been a negative correlation between the 
commissions charged (Avg_Com) and the market share of the AFP (Avg_Mkt), which is 
consistent with the idea that insurance markets (such as the AFPs market) present economies of 
scale. The average rate of return (Avg_ret) also shows to be significant while explaining the 
average commissions charged, reflecting that they may not be as arbitrary as it could be initially 
thought. Finally, the variable PI_ratio, tries to approximate the replacement rate (the pension 
received as a fraction of the workers’ pre-retirement income) of each AFP, by taking the average 
of the yearly ratio between the average pension and the average taxable income. This ratio 
does not show to be significant at any significance level, which is probably be due to the lack of 
real data on the variable.  
 
Summing up, the commissions charged by the AFPs seem to be related to the performance of 
the AFP in terms of the returns obtained and to the market share it holds. In terms of the 
concentration and competition in the market, recent data shows that a proper and good 
regulation may be the solution to the efficiency problems presented by the system during its 
first thirty years of existence. 
                                                            
17 The detailed data can be found in Appendix 1. 
Figure 6. Gretl estimation           Source: Sp. of Pensions 
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5.2.2. Capital Accumulation and Development of the Capital Market 
One of the many benefits that have been attributed to funded pension systems, is that as 
individual accounts increase –both in terms of quantity and size- the capital accumulation of the 
country increases, providing resources to the country that will help in the development of 
capital markets.  
 
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the capital funds in Chile, both in absolute and in relative terms. 
As it can be observed, the capital accumulation related to the pension funds increased 
substantially during the early 2000s. However, this phenomenon is mainly explained by the 
rapid economic growth that Chile experienced during that period, which boosted salaries and 
employment, thus increasing the pension funds. This is consistent with the behaviour of the 
fund/GDP ratio, which shows to increase at a much moderate rate than the absolute 
accumulated fund. This ratio shows an increasing trend until the 2008 economic crisis, going 
from a 45 per cent in 1999 to a 63 per cent in 2007. The volatility of the fund during the years of 
the Great Recession (2008-2011) and the fact that in 2016 the ratio fund/GDP is just at the 2007 
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While comparing the Chilean performance with the rest of Latin American18 countries that have 
implemented similar structural reforms, the results seem to be outstanding, as the Chilean 
capital accumulation has been about 3 times greater than the average of the region (figure 7). 
However, it is important to recall that the Chilean pension system has been implemented for a 
significantly longer period as the first country to follow the Chilean structural reform was Peru 
in 1993 –twelve years later.  
Besides the large capital accumulation Chile managed to accomplish, it is also important to 
analyse where has this capital been invested, since only a diversified portfolio that can share 
risks among various instrument will 
be sign of developed capital and 
financial markets. The Chilean 
portfolio composition of 2016 is 
presented in figure 8. One of the 
features that is most interesting to 
highlight is the significant 
percentage that is currently 
invested in foreign assets showing: 
(1) the persistence in the  
vulnerability of the Chilean pension 
system to the international 
financial situation; (2) that the 
Chilean stock market has not been able to provide enough investment opportunities for the 
pension fund, as only 8 per cent of it is invested in domestic assets in contrast to the 39 per cent 
invested in foreign emissions; and (3) that most of the resources accumulated through pension 
funds are not being used in national productive investment. Moreover, 83 per cent of the 
capital is being invested in instruments –foreign assets, government debt (mainly bonds issued 
by the Central Bank) and financial institutions’ assets- that have an uncertain and indirect effect 
on domestic real investment. 
Despite of the problems with the portfolio composition described above, several scholars agree 
that the 1981 reform did help in the development of a well regulated and secure capital market, 
which has promoted foreign and domestic investors’ confidence in the Chilean stock market. 
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5.3. Social Effects 
Perhaps one of the most important aspects that should be considered while analysing a pension 
system would be the social effects it has. Having a pension system that achieves great results in 
microeconomic and macroeconomic terms may be worthless if it does not fulfil the social needs. 
This section will review these effects in terms of its coverage, pensioner poverty and income 
and gender inequalities.  
5.3.1. Workers’ coverage 
In the Chilean pension system, the coverage does not only refer to how many people affiliates 
to the system, but also to its capacity to keep those affiliates contributing. Since the coverage is 
mandatory for every person that enters the labour market, the number of affiliates of the 
system does not give much relevant information about the system’s coverage over the labour 
force, as it can be observed in table 5. The fact that those affiliated to the system have been 
greater than the Economically Active Population (EAP) since the 2000s can be explained because 
every person who has had a formal salaried job is considered to be "affiliated" to the system, 
regardless of whether it remains in the labour force or not. For this reason, a better concept to 


















































































































Table 5. Disaggregated system coverage                      Sources: Sp. of Pensions, World Bank, OECD, AIOS 
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The results of the system in terms of coverage are hard to analyse, as they can either be 
successful or a complete failure depending on which aspect is analysed or which reference is 
being used. Table 5 presents the average evolution of several coverage indicators before the 
2008 reform and their yearly evolution after that reform.  
The first thing that is worth noticing is the positive effect in the affiliation of the self-employed 
workers the changes introduced by the 2008 reform had. The percentage of contributors among 
this group remained quite stable during the 1990s and the early 2000s, accounting for only 3.7 
per cent of the self-employed. The main explanation of this behaviour was that the pension 
fund could only be used in case of disability, retirement or death (for those who depended on 
the deceased), making the system less appealing to the self-employed workers who need to 
keep their savings in a more liquid fund to face the more unstable nature of their work. 
However, since 2008 the coverage has increased in almost 3 percentage points. While these 
numbers are still extremely precarious, they represent an important change in an historic trend. 
Furthermore, if we take into account that 26.5 per cent of the Chilean civil employees are self-
employed19, we could justify almost the totality of the 29.9 per cent of uncovered occupied 
population. Summing these two facts, it could be expected that in the future the system will be 
able to cover almost the whole occupied population. 
Nevertheless, we must not forget that the occupied population is not the whole population and 
that, as a consequence, the system leaves aside the coverage of informal workers and other 
vulnerable groups of the population that have an unstable working situation. If we contrast the 
Chilean coverage as a fraction of the EAP in 2004 (57.6 per cent), with the Latin American 
average coverage during the same year (26 per cent20), the results may seem successful. 
However, if we compare this coverage ratio with the coverage the system had before the 1981 
reform -64 per cent21, the results turn to be not as positive as it could have initially been 
thought, as that it took more than 30 years to the private funded system to achieve the 
coverage levels the public system had.  
 
                                                            
19 OECD data 2016 
20 Data from Mesa-Lago (2008, page 38) 
21 Ibid. 
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Another way of evaluating the coverage results of the system would be by assessing the 
elderlies’ coverage. Figure 9 shows the proportion of the Chilean population over 65 receiving 







According to the previous graph, during the whole period around 80 and 85 per cent of the 
elderly population received some kind of pension. However, this statistics include not only the 
old-age pensions paid by the funded system, but also pensions that are still paid by the PAYG 
system, pensions paid by the first pillar and other widow’s, survival and disability pensions. 
Table 5 provides more in detail information on the disaggregated source of those pensions. As it 
can be observed, in 2014 only 29.9 per cent of the population over age 65 received pension 
from the funded system and 22.4 per cent benefited from the PBS as they were not entailed to 
receive any other pension payment.  
The low coverage of the second pillar could be explained by several reasons22: (1) there is still a 
significant part of the population still receiving PAYG pensions; (2) it is the consequence of the 
low coverage the system showed during the first years of implementation; or (3) that the 
system is not yet mature enough, therefore its proportion of retirees is still too low. 
Notwithstanding and regardless of the justification, the low numbers and their rapid increase 
since 2008 may reflect that studying the benefits’ coverage among the elderly may still be too 
premature.  
                                                            
22 The reasons provided are only conjectures within the framework of this paper as disaggregated data on the other 
types of pensions was not publicly available. 
Evolution of the fraction of elderly population (+65)  
receiving a pension 
 
Figure 9 Source: Elaborate by Comisión (2015) based on the Chilean 
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5.3.2. Replacement Rates and Pensioner poverty 
The OECD defines the (Net) pension replacement rate of a system as the fraction the individual 
pension entitlement represents with respect to the pre-retirement earnings, net of personal 
income taxes social security contributions paid by the individual, measuring how effectively a 
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    16,3      11,3  
Table 6. Replacement rates and pensioner poverty                  Source: OECD (2015) 
1 AW: Average Wage; 2 Fraction of the population in relative income poverty 
Table 6 presents data from 2014 for Chile and the average for the OECD countries. The 
information provided shows that Chilean retirees receive pensions that are less than 50 per cent 
of their pre-retirement income, regardless of their previous income level23. This situation is 
especially critical for those living on the average wage, whose incomes are cut by a 65 per cent 
approximately at the time of their retirement. The result of this low replacement is higher 
poverty levels among the elderly, with almost 1 out of 5 people over 76 living with half of the 
median national household income (less than 10 USD per day24).  
The results do not seem to be any less precarious if they are compared with the average OECD 
situation. To put this in perspective, Figure 10 provides more in detail information for the men’s 
net pension replacement rate for the OECD countries25. For comparison purposes, the three 
Latin American countries have been outlined in red and the four other DC private pension 
systems have been highlighted in green. 
                                                            
23 Details on the differences between male and female retirees will be provided in section 4.3.4. 
24 OECD 2014 data. 
25 General results do not change if the women’s replacement rates are analysed instead.  
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As it can be observed, the non-Latin American countries that have DC private pension systems 
(Australia, Denmark and Israel) have replacement rates closer to the OECD average. However, 
within the Latin American context, it seems that the public systems (Argentina and Brazil) have 
had significantly better results than the DC private system (Chile and Mexico) in term of their 
replacement rates, which are approximately half of the ones obtained by the public systems of 
the region.  
Finally, in order to compare old-age 
poverty between OECD countries, figure 
11 presents the greater or lower 
likelihood of being poor while old as a 
way to compare countries with different 
general poverty levels. In this figure, we 
can observe that, although elderly are 
more likely to be poor than the rest of 
the population, Chile is not in the worst 
position in comparative terms. However, 
in terms of the performance of DC 
private models in general, it seems clear 
that the system is weaker than public 
systems while trying to avoid poverty 
















































































































































Replacement rates 2014 (Men)  
OECD countries 
Figure 10                                         Source: OECD (2015) 









Figure 11.                    Source: Elaborated by OECD 
(2015) 
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5.3.3. Income Inequality 
With a 0.465 Gini index and with the top 20% richest earning 10.6 times the average income of 
the bottom 20%, Chile is the most unequal OECD country26. Furthermore, the pension system 
pre-1981 was highly criticized for its segregation between different types of workers. For these 
two reasons, analysing whether the funded pension system reproduces the inequality and 
segregation levels seems quite relevant.  
Figure 12 presents household’s income information disaggregated by average age and decile of 
the household for year 1996. During that year, households with an average age between 25 and 
59 belonging to the tenth decile had an income that was 45.5 times the one of the first decile. 
Although this numbers are already very concerning, the situation is worse among household 
with a mean age higher than 60, where the tenth decile multiplied the first decile’s income by 
76.8.  
 
Although the previous figure presents information regarding any type of income and not only 
the retirement pensions, it reflects a situation that complements what was presented in the 
previous section: the Chilean pension system has not only failed in reducing elderlies’ poverty, 
but also in avoiding the reproduction of inequalities among the old-aged.  
Table 7 presents some features of the existing AFPs: the average taxable income of each AFP’s 
workers, as well as the average pensions received by their retirees and the average annual real 
                                                            















Distribution of average per capita income by ranges of the 
average household age and decile 
(Indexed income, 1996) 
[0,25) [25, 60) [60, +) 
Figure 12.                                                  Source: Chart 12 in Schatan (2005) 
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rate of return and the variable commission charged between 2002 and 2017. It has been 
coloured to highlight some interesting characteristics of the market: dark green represents the 
best performance; light green, the second best; yellow, intermediate; orange, medium-low 
performance; pinkish-red, low performance; and red, the worst performance. 
 
Average in thousands of CLP Average Annual Rate 
of Return 1 (%) 
Commission 1 
(%) AFP Income Pension 
CAPITAL 756 117 5,94 1,62 
CUPRUM 1336 337 6,20 1,97 
HABITAT 821 158 6,22 1,74 
MODELO 606 35  0,89 
PLANVITAL 519 100 5,75 2,12 
PROVIDA 594 108 5,77 1,92 
AVERAGE 722 126 6,02 1,71 
Table 7. Features of the existing AFPs in March 2017      
(1) 2002-2017 Average                                                                                          Source: SP. of Pensions 
 
The first thing that draws attention is that Planvital is the AFP which contributors have the 
lowest average taxable income and gets the lowest returns, yet it is the one that changes the 
highest commissions for their managerial services. It is also interesting to notice that Cuprum’s 
average taxable income more than doubles the average of Planvital and that it is among the 
ones with the highest rate of returns. Although a more in detail analysis would be necessary to 
corroborate it, from this brief and superficial analysis, it seems that the Chilean AFPs market still 
shows to be quite segregated, just like the previous system, having different AFPs for the 
different income groups of the society.  
Similar conclusions may be obtained from analysing the system’s coverage disaggregated by 
income quintiles (table 8). Only an average of 51.8 per cent of the employed workers belonging 
to the first quintile were covered by the pension system in 2002, with this percentage increasing 
with income quintiles, both for men and women. Similarly, the percentage of coverage tend to 
increase with the level of education achieved by the worker, going from less than one fourth of 
the none educated women to more than 90 per cent of women that have completed their 
university education27.  
 
                                                            
27 Differences in the coverage between men and women will be analysed in the next section. 
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Total 74,6 71,4 73 
Table 8. Coverage of the Employed Labour Force by gender and 
selected variables, 2002 (%)         Source: Table 8, Arenas de Mesa (2006) 
Notwithstanding the above, it is also important to take into consideration the redistributive 
effects the changes in the first pillar introduced by the 2008 reform may have had. Figure 13 
presents the distribution of pensions for retired women belonging to the 1960 cohort. As it can 
be observed, before the reform the highest pension density was on pensions between zero and 
200 thousand Chilean pesos (about 350 US dollars). However, the introduction of the APS and 
PBS by the 2008 reform has shifted the distribution, concentrating the density of distribution 
between 100 and 300 
thousand Chilean pesos 
(about 500 US dollars). 
Although these changes in 
pension’s distribution may 
not be the ultimate 
solution to the system’s 
inequality problems, it 
they may be a first step 
towards a more equitable 
and supportive model.  
Pension distribution – Women, 1960 cohort 
Figure 13.         Source: Attanasio (2011), page 42 
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5.3.4. Gender inequality 
Although gender inequality is not a particular problem of the Chilean pension system, as women 
in all pensions systems tend to have lower pensions, it is a dimension that is worth assessing at 
this point. Table 9 summarizes some indicators of the Chilean pension system by gender.  
As data shows, the proportion of employed women that contribute to the system is higher than 
men’s. However, when the population is disaggregated by educational level and occupational 
category, significant gender inequalities appear among the most vulnerable groups: coverage 
among women with no education or that perform domestic services is more than 20 percentage 
points lower than the one of men under the same conditions. Nonetheless, these inequalities 
are not present among employers and salaried workers and tend to disappear progressively as 
the educational level increases.  
While studying the behaviour of the pensions received, women show lower values for all the 
indicators analysed: even after summing the APS, average retirement pensions are 33 per cent 
lower than those received by men and the net pension replacement rate is 4.6 points lower for 
women earning the average wage than for men. However, these results are not very surprising 
if we analysed in detail the determinants of the Chilean pensions. First, pensions are 
determined by the rates of return of the pension fund, which do not show gender inequality 
issues. Second, the contribution density, which is lower for women due to factors like: (1) a 
lower average taxable income caused by labour market discrimination and a larger share of 
unskilled jobs; and (2) less average contribution years, explained by higher unemployment rates 
and time out for raising children. Finally, the expected years in retirement, which are larger for 
women because women’s life expectancy is higher, but also because the Chilean legal age of 
retirement is 5 years earlier for female workers. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that 
even though women are allowed to retire at age 60, the effective age of retirement is 67, 
almost as high as the effective age of retirement for male (68.4). These seven extra years of 
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Demographic and economic context    
Participation rate2 48.2 71.5 -23.3 
Unemployment rate2 7.0 6.1 0.9 










Expected years in retirement4 19.1 15.1 4.0 
Contribution density (%)3 43.8 59.8 -16.0* 
Average contributed years1 16.7 18.7 -1.94 
Average taxable income (USD)1 961.8 1121.4 -14.23 
First pillar  
PBS1 
Number (Thousands) 
















Table 9. Gender data 
Sources: 
1
 Superintendence of Pensions (2016 data); 
2 
OECD (2016 data); 
3
 Arenas de Mesa (2006); 
4
 OECD, 
Pensions at a glance (2015) 
* Computed as (W–M)/M 
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The pension reform of 2008 introduced measures specifically aimed at reducing this gender 
inequality, such as changes in the regulation of the disability and survival insurance and in the 
division of the capitalization fund in case of divorce, and the creation a Born child bond, which is 
transferred by the state to the woman’s individual account at the time of retirement. 
Additionally, the reform introduced other measures which target the whole population –such as 
the introduction of the PBS and the APS- that have actually helped a greater number of women 
than men (169.4 and 38 per cent more, respectively). However, even when women have made a 
larger use of the benefits introduced, the gap existing between the average pensions received 
does not seem to decline, staying at a 33 per cent regardless of whether the APS is considered 
or not.  
 
From a more international perspective, we can observe in figure 15 that gender inequalities in 
terms of the net replacement rate are not very common, as the vast majority of OECD countries 
(30) do not show any differences between men and women in this indicator. However, it is 
important to highlight that this does not mean that in those countries women have the exact 
same pension than men, but that they receive the same proportion of their pre-retirement 
earnings. In other words, those countries with zero gap reproduce the exact same gender 
inequalities their labour markets may exhibit, while those countries with a negative gap in the 
net replacement rate –such as Chile- not only reproduce, but exacerbate those pre-existing 
inequalities. Thus, although Chile is not among the worst performers in this respect, it still has a 






Net replacement rate gap  
* Countries with zero gap: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany,Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA 
Figure 15                                 Source: OECD (2015) 
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5.4. Social knowledge and perception of the system28 
The Chilean pension reform was devised as the free-market version of a pension system, where 
the AFPs model would work as a perfectly competitive market. By doing so, policymakers not 
only assumed that there would be many buyers and sellers, but also that there would be perfect 
information. For this reason, a key ingredient to a well-functioning funded pension system 
would be that Chilean workers know their pension system. Figure 16 shows the level knowledge 
Chileans have about several elements of the system. It also collects some indicators on the 
perception of the system’s well-functioning.  
On one side, in terms of the knowledge about the general structure of the system, only 16 
percent of the respondents know the contribution rate –the percentage increases significantly 
as labour income increases- and 72 per cent of the population knows that each individual owns 
its pension fund. With respect to the latter, it is interesting to highlight that among the lower 
income population only 3 per cent of the population knows who owns of the pension fund and 
that 67 per cent thinks it belongs to the AFP.  
On the other side, while considering the information provided by the AFPs, 45 per cent of the 
population declares having received an AFP’s Account Status29 during the last 12 months and 
only 38 per cent of them think that the account status was clear enough to get information 
about their fund. Referring to the knowledge on the rates of return and commissions charged by 
the AFPs –probably the key elements to promote competition between AFPs- only 26 per cent 
of respondents considers having some information about the returns obtained by their pension 
fund and just an 11 per cent affirms to know which the commission charged by their AFP is. At 
this point, it is worth noticing that not every AFP provides the same information as this aspect is 
not regulated by law.  This lack of information is reflected in the low percentage of people that 
has changed either from AFP –21 per cent- or that has changed between the five multi-funds 
the AFPs have –8 per cent.  
                                                            
28 This section is mainly based on a survey executed by the Chilean Presidential Commission on the Pension System 
during 2014.  
29 Two examples of AFPs’ account status and an information bulletin are provided in appendix 2 (In Spanish). 
Affiliates to the other 3 AFPs declared not having received any information from their AFP during the last months.  
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Regarding the perception Chileans have on the benefits the system provides, the results are not 
hopeful at all: only a 5 per cent thinks the pensions are enough to maintain a living standard, 14 
per cent think pensions received will meet their expectations, and 70 percent of the 
respondents (both working and retired) think the pensions are not enough to cover their 
spending. Surprisingly, and besides the generalized perception of a precarious pension system, 
41 per cent of the Chileans declares to be satisfied with the system. 
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One of the reforms recently proposed by the Chilean government to solve the problems 
perceived by the Chilean population was the creation of a public AFP. As Figure 16 shows, a 79 
per cent of the population thinks there should be a public AFP and a 69 per cent declares the 
intention of changing to it. This high percentage may be probably explained by the fact that only 
an 8 per cent thinks the AFPs have been efficient in administrating pension funds and only a 14 
per cent considers AFP’s to be trustworthy. Further, a 42 per cent believes that the State could 







However, when asked about the possible reforms that could be implemented to improve the 
system, 66 per cent declares that only a structural reform would help solve the system’s 
problems. This is consistent with the other answers provided and with the fact that 29 of the 
respondents considers that pensions should be financed through social effort. It further reflects 
the level of general discomfort the Chilean society has with their funded pension system. 
Level of agreement with certain aspects of the pension system (%) 
Doesn’t agree  
Agrees  
Figure 16         Source: Comisión (2015) 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Assessment of the results: Did the reform accomplish its objectives? 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the results of the 1981 reform could be assessed as not 
very successful.  The length and size of the fiscal burden imposed –higher than expected, offset 
the positive effects the reform may have had on national savings and economic growth –
assuming the pension reform did had any effect on those magnitudes. As explained in section 
5.1.2. after 1981 there was indeed an increase in national savings, however, isolating the 
pension reform from the other reforms that took place during those years can be extremely 
challenging if not impossible, making the estimation of the effects extremely complex. 
Moreover, we must emphasize that although desirable, the pursuit of these macroeconomic 
effects should not constitute a core objective of a pension reform.  
Additionally, the Chilean case evidences that a structural reform may not be the answer to 
reduce the fiscal pressures in the short and medium-run. Although funded DC pensions do not 
have sustainability problems by definition, the issuing of recognition bonds30 makes explicit the 
former implicit pension debt, forcing the government to finance the pension debt with other 
sources of the fiscal budget (Uthoff, 2001). Thereby, the implementation of a scheme similar to 
the Chilean system imposes transitional fiscal costs that countries trying to solve fiscal 
sustainability problems derived from adverse demographics –like Spain- may not be able to 
afford.  Yet, as Barr (2009) highlights, “These high fiscal costs are not in themselves a defect, but 
they serve as a reminder to other countries that pensions systems inescapably involve public 
spending and that the time horizon of transition cost is likely to be long”.  
From a microeconomic perspective, results have not either been the desired. As Berstein (2011) 
explains, the success of a private system with individual capitalisation accounts depends, to a 
great extent, on having a competitive industry, that manages to be highly efficient at the lowest 
possible cost and administrating the in a secure and profitable way. However, the AFPs market 
is far from being a competitive industry, as it has always been quite concentrated. Yet, we must 
                                                            
30 Chilean fiscal costs are the highest among 8 of the Latin American countries that implemented similar structural 
reforms to their pension systems. According to studies made by Mesa-Lago (2005, 2006), Chilean fiscal costs are 2.4 
the average of the other countries’ costs and can be mainly explained by the generosity of the recognition bonds 
which, although fair, have not been the most common policy. 
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also assert that recent reforms seem to have broken that trend, reducing the market share of 
the biggest AFPs as well as reducing the average commission from a 2.67 per cent of the labour 
income in 2008 to a 1.16 in 2016.  
In this regard, it is also important to highlight that although the 2008 reform broke a trend, 
these changes should not be overstated: the bidding of the new affiliates provides little to no 
incentives to the AFPs which already have a large number of affiliates, as they have a better 
chance of making profits by increasing commissions to their clients (Comisión, 2015b). Thus, this 
change in trend will not be long lasting if it is not accompanied by a more informed society. As 
shown in section 5.4. Chileans do not consider AFPs to be efficient in the administration of the 
pension funds, however just a minority of the population declares to have some information on 
commissions and returns. As an ECLAC report of 1999 explained, consumers of the AFPs market 
exhibit low price elasticity, however better information and a greater consciousness that 
individual choices may have an effect on the AFPs’ incentives to improve their efficiency, could 
change that situation. Thereby, introducing a stricter regulation on the information AFPs 
provide to their affiliates could be a key element to reduce transaction costs, promoting a 
movement of affiliates to the most efficient AFPs, thus, encouraging a more competitive and 
efficient behaviour of the market.  Perhaps the creation of a public AFP -as suggested by the 
current government- could have a similar effect, but I think that the mere introduction of better 
regulation could help the market’s competition.  
With regard to the capital accumulation, the Chilean pension fund has indeed provided an 
important amount of resources to the capital markets: Chile has the biggest capital 
accumulation among private systems, accounting around a 60 per cent of the GDP. This capital 
accumulation along with the introduction of several regulations on capital markets, have helped 
constitute a secure and mature capital market. However, as Arenas de Mesa (2006, page 166) 
highlights, “Chile’s pension reform has contributed to the development of a previously existing 
capital market, but the assertion that a matured capital market is not needed as a precondition 
of pension reform is negated by both the experience of Chile and several other private systems, 
particularly in small countries.” 
Yet, both the collapse of the capital fund in 2008 and the high percentage of funds invested in 
foreign assets –thirty-nine per cent in 2016- emboss the vulnerability of the Chilean pension 
system to the fluctuations in international capital markets. Thereby, pensions received by 
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Chilean retirees are not only determined by individual effort and the efficient performance of 
the AFPs, as the system preaches, but are also determined by external factors, that are out the 
reach of the system’s control, making pension benefits plagued by uncertainty.  
In terms of its social effects, as explained in section 4.2.2., the Chilean Pension system prior 
1981 had several equity problems, not respecting the principle of horizontal equity: different 
types of workers paid different rates of contribution and received different benefits that did not 
had any relation with the payments made. In this respect, the standardization the system 
required was partially accomplished by the reform: all workers pay the same 10% contribution 
rate and get a pension that is calculated following the same principles, regardless of their 
income level. However, it wasn’t until the 2008 reform that self-employed workers were 
gradually obliged to affiliate to the system and that the fix and regressive component of the 
commissions charged was eliminated. Furthermore, as explained in section 5.3.3., the system 
shows several inequality problems mainly derived from the lower coverage of vulnerable groups 
of the population, but probably also derived from the significantly lower information that 
workers with a lower income have about the functioning of the system (section 5.4.). The 
system’s inequality problems are further fed by gender disparities reflected in a net pension 
replacement rate that is 4.6 percentage points lower for women than for men. Therefore, 
although the current Chilean pension system does not have the privileged groups that existed 
before 198131 and it has the highest coverage among the Latin American context, it still has 
many challenges to face in terms of ensuring a homogeneous pension treatment for all its 
citizens.  
It is also interesting to highlight, that funded systems tend to reproduce the problems existing in 
the labour market in which they operate as a consequence of their lack of redistributive 
objectives. Also, they are supposed to reward individual saving’s efforts, however, this should 
not put in disadvantage those workers who cannot make further efforts. Perhaps, the problem 
with the Chilean pensions system is not the system itself, but the labour market which is 
reproducing, as Chile is the OECD country with highest income inequality. Hereafter, a purely 
funded system may not the best alternative for the country.  
 
                                                            
31 Except for the Armed Forces. 
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Finally, if we assess the reform in terms of what economic theory says about the objectives a 
pension system should achieve –consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief and 
distributional objectives-, the results are not much brighter. Even when the objective of a DC 
system is mainly consumption smoothing, the low net replacement rates of the Chilean pension 
system do not seem to confirm its compliance (Barr, 2008). This is further confirmed by the 
perception Chileans have on their system, as only 5 per cent thinks the pensions paid by the 
funded system are enough to finance an adequate life standard.  
In terms of the achievement of the insurance objective, the results will depend on the payment 
method chosen by the retiree: if the pension benefits are paid through the annuities method, 
then the pension system does work as an insurance for the worker’s life length; however, if they 
are paid as programmed withdrawn, them the worker will keep bearing the risk of the 
uncertainty. 
Finally, the poverty relief and distributional objectives are not by themselves objectives of an 
individual capitalisation system as the Chilean, however, the strengthening of the first pillar 
introduced by the 2008 reform has had an important impact on those two objectives improving 
the life quality of the Chilean elderlies.  
6.2. Future challenges 
Although the Chilean pension system shows several deficiencies, there is an agreement among 
scholars that its ultimate problem is the precariousness of the pensions it provides. As the final 
objective of a pension should be to provide a sufficient income to retirees, increasing current 
pensions and creating the adequate conditions to ensure better future pensions is, nowadays, 
one of the main concerns of Chilean policymakers. In this respect, the Presidential Commission 
on the Pension system has identified and provided some guides to address ten issues that 
should be solved in order to improve the system’s efficiency and sufficiency. 
1) Strengthening and enlarging the extent of the first pillar, specifically by: (1) increasing the 
amounts paid by the APS and PBS as they have been set at a rate that is too close to the 
poverty lines; (2) increasing the coverage of the population to the 80 per cent with lower 
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income instead of the 60 per cent that currently covers; and (3) improving the 
administrative procedures related to obtaining those benefits.  
2) Strengthening the second pillar by enlarging its coverage and the contribution density, 
especially among the self-employed workers and the lower-income workers. This could be 
achieved by changing the administrative procedures and requisites of the first pillar, as they 
currently create disincentives to contribute or to contribute declaring a lower taxable 
income32.  
3) Increasing the savings for the second pillar as the accumulated fund constitutes one of the 
key determinants of the final amount of the benefits received. In this respect, the 
Presidential Commission suggests increasing the contribution rate, since the 10% rate is far 
from the 19.6% average of the OECD countries, mainly by introducing a 4% contribution in 
charge of the employer.  
4) Readjusting the legal retirement age to face the ageing trend of the Chilean demography as 
well as reducing the gender disparities explained in section 5.3.4.  
5) Reducing the risks bared by affiliates to avoid drops in the accumulated fund like the 
experienced during 2008 –which was almost entirely borne by contributors-, but also to 
ensure the highest returns as possible. 
6) Promoting price competition among AFPs by widening the affiliates included in the bidding, 
as the results of this policy have not been the expected. Additionally, the Commission 
recommends the creation of a Public AFP and allowing the entrance and creation of non-
profit AFPs. 
7) Reducing gender disparities by homogenizing the legal retirement age and the life 
expectancy calculations, as well as creating a marital shared fund.  
8) Promoting education on the pension system. Although this issue was addressed in the 2008 
reform, the results have not been sufficient as a great part of the population does not have 
the adequate knowledge to take rational and informed decisions on their pension fund.  
9) Reducing the uncertainty on the pension benefits by eliminating the Programmed 
Withdrawn as a method of payment.  
                                                            
32 Some benefits are still subjected to declaring a low or non-existing labour income. 
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10) Ensure and homogenize pension rights by eliminating some incompatibilities of the first 
pillar with other public transfers, and by implanting and structural reform on the Armed 
Forces social security.  
The Chilean Minister of Finance estimated the costs of implementing all these 
recommendations at only a 0.4 per cent of the GDP. Yet, the recommendations rested in 
congress for more than 2 years until April 2017, while this paper was being drafted.  
6.3. Recent proposal 
During a national chain speech33, the President of Chile announced a pension reform bill that 
will be presented to congress addressing some of the recommendations made by the 
Commission. The bill specifically proposes: 
1) The introduction of a 5% contribution in charge of the employer. The management of this 
additional contribution will be in charge of a new public institution.  
2) Three per cent of this extra contrition will go to an individual capitalization account. The 
other two per cent will be used to create a collective savings’ insurance that will have 
redistribution purposes. 
3)  Greater participation of the affiliates in the decision-making of the AFPs. 
4) Incentives to link commissions charged by the AFPs to the returns obtained. 
We will have to wait and see if these proposals turn to be a law or if they get lost in congress, as 
a new presidential election approaches. In any case, and although they only address some of the 
problems the current system has, they are going in the right direction in strengthening the 
system’s first and second pillar. 
  
                                                            
33 Appendix 3 contains the full transcript of the speech (In Spanish) 
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VII. CONCLUSSIONS  
Almost four decades have passed since the Chilean pension reform was implemented and 
although the system is financially adequate in the context of an ageing population, it still has a 
long way to go before reaching its objectives. The reform did had a positive effect on the 
development of capital markets, however, this should not be, by any means, the main purpose 
of a pension reform, as most basic goal of any pension system should be to provide a sufficient 
income to its retirees. The Chilean funded system has not been able to meet this goal.  
As mentioned before, purely funded systems tend to reproduce the problems existing in the 
labour market, thus, this pension scheme may not the best alternative for the Chile. In this 
respect, the 2008 reform was a big step forward, as it transformed the Chilean pension system 
partially into a mixed scheme, adding a first solidarity pillar to the two that already existed. It 
also managed to break the concentration trend in the AFPs markets, promoting a more 
competitive and efficient behaviour and increased the coverage among self-employed. 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of problems continues to persist: low coverage among the most 
vulnerable groups, the exacerbation of gender inequalities, extremely low replacement rate 
that result in an average pension that is lower than the minimum pensions guaranteed by the 
APS, high levels of risk and uncertainty bared by workers and retirees and an AFPs market that 
remains inefficient as great part of the population does not even have basic (not to talk about 
perfect) information, are just some of the issues the system continues to have. Thereby, further 
reforms aimed at strengthening and balancing the three pillars must be implemented in order 
to achieve a system that manages to be not only financially, but also socially sustainable.  
The policy recommendations made by the Presidential Commission in 2015 went in this 
direction, as they not only tried to solve the financial and efficiency issues of the system, but 
also tried to address the social demands arisen during the last decade. The Presidential 
announcement made some months ago partially addresses these issues too. If these reforms 
are implemented, they will help easing the problems the pension system is facing and move 
forward to improve it. Only by doing so, the Chilean pensions system will be able to approach 
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Appendix 3: Transcript of the Presidential announcement (April 2017) 
“Amigas y amigos,  
Todos sabemos desde hace tiempo que en Chile las pensiones son insuficientes. Que muchos 
sufren una disminución enorme de sus ingresos cuando jubilan, particularmente en el caso de 
las mujeres y la clase media. Este no es un fenómeno nuevo ni en el que podamos dar 
respuestas mágicas. De hecho es un debate que está presente en muchos países desarrollados. 
Tenemos que asumir que los cambios deben ser graduales y viables. Las razones y explicaciones 
pueden ser variadas, pero lo que no cambia es la potencia del mensaje que ha hecho oír la 
ciudadanía. Quieren que afrontemos este problema con voluntad y con seriedad. Los chilenos 
quieren y necesitan mejores pensiones. Sabemos que para ellos el esfuerzo individual es clave y 
debe ser reconocido, pero que en muchísimos casos no bastará para llegar con tranquilidad a la 
vejez. Por eso debemos avanzar hacia un sistema previsional realmente mixto: donde todos 
pongan su parte, donde la solidaridad vaya de la mano del esfuerzo personal, donde el Estado y 
los empleadores hagan la parte que les corresponde. Ese principio de protección y solidaridad 
ha inspirado desde siempre mis políticas, por eso como Presidenta lideré el año 2008 la reforma 
previsional que permitió la creación del Pilar Solidario y gracias a lo cual hay miles de 
compatriotas que hoy reciben una pensión. Con ello comenzamos a cambiar gradualmente el 
paradigma de nuestras pensiones y devolverle un rol al Estado y no nos hemos detenido. En 
Enero de este año, pese al difícil momento económico, entregamos un reajuste del 10% a la 
Pensión Básica Solidaria. ¿Es suficiente? ¡Claro que no! Pero vamos avanzando con decisión en 
la medida de nuestras posibilidades y convencidos que lo hacemos en la dirección correcta.  
En Agosto del año pasado, por cadena nacional, convoqué a la construcción de un acuerdo 
nacional para mejorar las pensiones en Chile. Todos los sectores políticos de sumaron 
generosamente a este esfuerzo nacional y quiero agradecerlo públicamente. A pesar de no 
alcanzarse un acuerdo total, hubo propuestas constructivas. Se levantó información muy valiosa 
y que sirve de base para cualquier iniciativa y se identificaron con más claridad los aspectos 
comunes. No podemos seguir esperando. Hoy debemos dar un paso más. Quiero dar a conocer 
una propuesta que recoge gran parte de este proceso de diálogo y que presentaremos como 
proyecto de ley.  
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Se trata de una propuesta que primero permitirá subir en promedio en 20% los montos de las 
actuales pensiones de vejez entregadas por las AFP. Segundo, permitirá proyectar un aumento 
promedio cercano a 50% en las pensiones que tendrán los actuales cotizantes al momento de su 
jubilación cuando el sistema esté en pleno funcionamiento. ¿Cuáles son los mecanismos que 
proponemos concretamente? 
Vamos establecer una nueva cotización de 5% para crear un nuevo sistema de ahorro colectivo. 
Se hará con cargo al empleador y en un periodo de 6 años, para garantizar una mejor transición. 
La administración recaerá en una entidad pública y autónoma. Con reglas estrictas y altas 
exigencias profesionales, para que nadie pueda poner en duda su eficiencia, transparencia e 
independencia. Ese 5% se dividirá en dos. Un 3% irá directamente a una cuenta personal de 
cada trabajador. Este incremento será heredable y de plena propiedad. El restante 2%, irá a un 
seguro de ahorro colectivo. Estos recursos serán administrados con un fuerte carácter 
redistributivo, para que además de la solidaridad intergeneracional, exista apoyo hacia los que 
logran un menor ahorro y pensiones más bajas. De este modo, junto al Pilar Solidario, el pilar 
contributivo tendrá un sistema de capitalización individual y un sistema de ahorro colectivo con 
seguro.  
Para responder a la legítima demanda por transparencia del sistema, proponemos que los 
afiliados tengan participación en la definición de las políticas de inversión, así como en las 
políticas de solución de conflictos de interés. Además, las administradoras dejarán de tener 
exclusividad para nombrar directores en las empresas en las que invierten los fondos de 
pensiones, porque también tendrán un rol los propios afiliados, a través de su Comisión de 
Usuarios. Por otra parte, se crearán mecanismos o incentivos para que el cobro de las 
comisiones esté relacionado con los beneficios reportados a los afiliados. No es posible que 
cuando a un administrador le vaya mal, el único que asuma el costo sea el afiliado. 
Amigas y amigos, no hemos renunciado a nuestro sello: el hacer frente a los problemas del país. 
Hoy seguimos avanzando para que las pensiones dejen de ser una fuente de angustia y sean lo 
que deben ser: un sustento para una vejez digna. Al igual que antes logramos introducir un Pilar 
Solidario al sistema previsional, hoy estamos introduciendo un sistema de ahorro colectivo que 
complementa el esfuerzo individual. En el futuro, estos avances deben ser complementados con 
otros de acuerdo a la realidad del país y las necesidades sociales, porque Chile es muchísimo 
más que la suma de 17 millones de individuos. Somos una comunidad humana, cuya fortaleza es 
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la responsabilidad y la solidaridad. Chile necesita este tipo de seguro social. Nos hace bien como 
país mirarnos de otra forma y estoy segura que el futuro proyecto de ley de esta propuesta 
tendrá una buena acogida. 
Muchas gracias y muy buenas noches.” 
Michelle Bachelet 
April 12th, 2017 
 
